Payments fraud · for every business

Pay the vendor. Not the impostor.

Every business pays suppliers, and fraudsters know it. An email from a lookalike domain changes a vendor's bank details, and the next invoice goes to a fraudster's account. Omnareth checks every bank change and payment against the vendor master before money moves, and recognizes the same account when it turns up on another vendor.

11 reference rules9/9 scenario decisions verified75 ms median decision, lab test

Payment decisions · one fraud account, three vendorspayments-fraud/demo.sh
#EventDecision
1 Genuine Northwind Steel invoice to its verified account ALLOW
2 'Northwind' emails new bank details from northwlnd-steel.com DENY BANK_CHANGE_UNVERIFIED · LOOKALIKE_DOMAIN
3 A clerk keys the new account and requests payment
▲ Repeat offender opened for the account; account watched
DENY UNKNOWN_BANK_ACCOUNT
4 Same account sent to Fabrikam Logistics from another lookalike DENY BANK_CHANGE_UNVERIFIED · LOOKALIKE_DOMAIN · WATCHLIST_MATCH · REPEAT_OFFENDER
5 Same account on a Tailspin Packaging payment
▲ One account across three vendors: case opened
DENY UNKNOWN_BANK_ACCOUNT · WATCHLIST_MATCH · REPEAT_OFFENDER · ACCOUNT_HOPPING
6 Fabrikam invoice submitted a second time DENY DUPLICATE_INVOICE
7 A clerk approves their own payment DENY SOD_VIOLATION
– Analyst confirms the case
▲ Account blocked for every vendor
analyst · state
– An insider adds the account to Tailspin's verified accounts analyst · state
8 Payment to the now "verified" account DENY WATCHLIST_BLOCK · REPEAT_OFFENDER · ACCOUNT_HOPPING
9 Genuine Tailspin invoice ALLOW
9/9 decisions as expected · every record verified on chain

How it fits

A check before the payment run

Your ERP or payment platform sends each vendor bank change and each payment request to Omnareth, and releases only what it allows. Nothing else in the process changes.

The record

The vendor master

Each vendor carries its verified email domain, the bank accounts verified by callback, its usual invoice limit and the invoices already paid.

The events

Bank changes and payments

A bank change must be verified by callback and come from the vendor's own domain. A payment must go to a verified account, once, approved by someone else.

The memory

One account, many vendors

Omnareth holds the fraudster's account responsible, never the vendor or the clerk, and recognizes it when it is pushed onto another vendor.

Reference rules

11 rules for vendor payments

Ready to adapt to your approval policy. Authorization checks fail closed: an account that is not on the verified list is not paid.

ThreatWhat Omnareth checksRule codeDecision
Bank detail change fraudNew bank account not verified by callback to a known contactBANK_CHANGE_UNVERIFIEDDENY
Business email compromiseChange request from a domain other than the vendor's verified domainLOOKALIKE_DOMAINDENY
Payment diversionPayment to an account that is not a verified account of the vendorUNKNOWN_BANK_ACCOUNTDENY
Duplicate invoiceInvoice number already paidDUPLICATE_INVOICEDENY
Self-approvalRequester and approver are the same personSOD_VIOLATIONDENY
Paying a vendor on holdVendor is on hold or blockedVENDOR_NOT_ACTIVEDENY
Unusual amountInvoice above the vendor's limitOVER_LIMITFLAG
Known fraud accountA bank account, domain or person blocked on the watchlistWATCHLIST_BLOCKDENY
Watched identityAn identity under watch, added by an analyst or automaticallyWATCHLIST_MATCHFLAG
Repeat offenderAn identity implicated in 2 or more denied events in the last 30 daysREPEAT_OFFENDERFLAG
One account, many vendorsAn account or domain implicated in denials on 2 or more other vendors in 24 hoursACCOUNT_HOPPINGFLAG

The insider case

Marked verified. Still not paid.

In the reference scenario, after the analyst confirms the case, someone adds the fraudster's account to a vendor's verified accounts. The next payment passes every vendor check. Omnareth refuses it on the watchlist, and the audit record, anchored on chain, shows the block it acted on.

Fair

Vendors are victims

A payment to a fraud account counts against the account, not the vendor it was meant for, and not the clerk who keyed it.

Controls

Policy as rules

Callback verification, segregation of duties and invoice limits run on every request, with the reason recorded.

Evidence

For auditors and insurers

Every refused change and payment is sealed with what was known at the time, and verifiable later.

Your process

Beyond vendor payments

The same platform takes refunds, payouts or any approval flow: define the record, the events and which fields identify people and accounts.

Pilot program

Put payments fraud prevention to work in 90 days

One lane, facility or process, in shadow mode, with results measured against criteria we agree with you. Qualified companies and organizations can apply.